IDA Complaint to Air Force in Advance
of Award of Chimps to TCF

In Defense of Animals
131 Camino Alto, Suite E
Mill Valley, CA 94941
717-939-3231 (research line)
July 23, 1998

Secretary of Defense William Cohen
1400 Defense Pentagon
Room 3E880
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Cohen:

Please consider this a formal complaint filed by In Defense of Animals (IDA) regarding the Air Force chimpanzee divestiture process. We respectfully request that this complaint be made part of the official record, because it has direct relevance to the Air Force's decision-making process, fulfilling of Congress' intent for the chimps as outlined the 1997 Defense Authorization Bill, and the Air Force RFP. IDA believes it is also important to be made part of the official record because of the Air Force's long-standing, documented bias in favor of The Coulston Foundation (TCF), which will be discussed later in this complaint.

This complaint contains new information that we believe will clearly demonstrate that TCF cannot meet Congress' requirement that the recipient of the chimps provide "adequate care," nor the Air Force's own RFP's strict financial and animal care requirements, and includes information regarding the following:

• TCF's financial outlook, including information about rejected NIH grant applications, recent NIH actions that will also prevent TCF from obtaining NIH funds in the future, apparent loss of private drug company contracts, a Congressional inquiry into NIH contracts at TCF, and TCF's crushing financial burden for the chimps it already owns, all of which call into serious question TCF's long-term financial prospects as well as its ability to meet the RFP's strict financial criteria. This section also includes disturbing information from sources that Air Force personnel were at Holloman Air Force base in early June, taking measurements purportedly to ascertain the most efficient way to raze the chimp housing buildings on the base;
• TCF's abysmal animal care record, which is unprecedented in the 32-year history of the Animal Welfare Act, including information regarding a current, official USDA investigation into more chimp deaths at TCF, some of which have occurred within the past month, as well as serious concerns regarding the membership and functioning of TCF's federally mandated Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC);
• TCF's extraordinarily high veterinary and other staff turnover -- including information regarding another veterinarian who just left days ago, detailed descriptions of TCF's staffing history, on-site visit reports expressing concerns about its staffing and how such turnover, as well as lack of experienced chimp clinicians, directly affect TCF's ability to meet the strict animal care criteria of the RFP and Congress' mandate for "adequate care";
• TCF's repeated failure to fulfill legally binding contractual obligations, including those that have direct relevance to meeting the strict RFP criteria as well as Congressional intent, including obligations in relation to another RFP five years ago that TCF used to obtain ownership of New Mexico State University's chimp colony;
• The Air Force's documented history of bias in favor of TCF, which crippled any IDA attempt to formulate a responsible, credible bid that could meet the strict financial, facility and animal care criteria of the RFP as well as Congress' intent for adequate care for the chimps.

However, IDA is concerned that despite this information, the Air Force will continue its bias in favor of TCF and award chimps to the Foundation, in what we believe would be a clear violation of both Congress' intent and its own RFP criteria. If the Air Force honestly follows Congress's intent and its own RFP criteria, we believe it cannot and must not award any chimps to TCF. Please be advised that any such award, in light of the overwhelming evidence documenting TCF's inability to meet Congress' intent and the RFP criteria, will be vigorously protested by any and all means at our disposal.

1. TCF'S Extremely Questionable Long-term Financial Outlook

A. Already-Crushing Financial Liability of Owning 450-500 Chimps

No other bidder for the Air Force chimps even comes close to TCF's crushing long-term financial burden of owning 450-500 chimps. That is tens of millions of dollars in long-term financial liability that must be considered as debt by the thorough financial audit the Air Force is no doubt conducting on all bidders (such an audit would be mandated by the RFP's strict financial criteria and Congress' intent that the recipient must provide "adequate care," which can only occur with necessary funds). (Such an audit should of course also consider any taxes owed, any outstanding debts, provable cash flow, etc.) Does TCF come even close to having such money -- and remember, this is liability it already has, without owning a single Air Force chimp? It should be noted that in a May 1994 NIH site visit report (available upon request), TCF told the site visitors that it would cost $17 million for the lifetime care of 150 Air Force chimps. Remember, this was in 1994 dollars, and also did not mention buildings, but simply care. That $17 million may be high, but it is not out of the ballpark. Now multiply that $17 million -- or even $10 million -- by three, and that equals the long-term financial liability that TCF currently has with its ownership of 450-500 chimps. Again, does TCF even come close to proving that is has the financial wherewithal to fund the chimps it already owns? Now, add $5-$10 million for the Air Force chimps -- does TCF come even close to having even $5 million, let alone the $30+ million it needs for the chimps it already owns? Also remember that TCF's chimp population almost certainly skews younger than the Air Force chimps, many of whom are over 20, and that, according to sources, TCF is still breeding chimps, and thus adding even more to its crushing long-term financial liability for the next 30-40 years. Moreover, if TCF plans to move the chimps off of Holloman AFB, construction of new chimpanzee housing buildings -- even without the Air Force chimps -- would most likely cost at least $1.5-2 million. Does TCF have the capability to obtain such money considering its current financial situation? A thorough audit would be able to answer such questions.

B. National Institute on Aging's Total Rejection of TCF's Attempt to Gain Funds/TCF's Failure to Obtain Congressional Appropriation

According to the office of Rep. John Edward Porter (R-IL), the National Institute on Aging (NIA) recently rejected a grant application submitted by TCF on or about October 1, 1997. It is important to remember that TCF does not have a single peer-reviewed, investigator-initiated NIH grant in any field of scientific research, including aging.

However, most importantly, on May 21-22, 1998, the NIA's National Advisory Council on Aging unanimously slammed shut any possibility of TCF's obtaining any significant NIA funding for its proposed "National Center for the Study of Aging in Primates," which TCF announced in Spring 1996. According to the summary minutes, the NIA announced its recommendation that the agency not fund any large-scale projects for supporting aging chimpanzees, and that there was substantial existing chimp capacity being under-utilized. After researching the issue, NIA estimated that such a chimp aging center would cost between $8 and $15 million annually, which gives some idea of just how expensive chimpanzees are to maintain. NIA also issued a questionnaire to 1,600 NIA grantees; of the 58 respondents, 51 said they were not interested in using chimps, 3 said they might be interested, and 4 indicated an interest, but 3 of those 4 were interested primarily in post-mortem material. The minutes state the following: "Following discussion, Council passed the following motion unanimously: The National Advisory Council on Aging advises that there is no scientific demand for a center for aging chimpanzees. There is substantial current capacity not being utilized. NIA will establish a mechanism to make interested investigators aware of the available resources. Further, the NIA is advised not to accept any large-scale proposals to support such a center" (emphasis added). As stated above, the Advisory Council, which is the final step in the peer review process, unanimously passed this motion. NIA also stated that major reasons why scientists do not use chimps is the huge expense as well as the ethical restrictions of using chimps, and that almost everything that could be studied on chimps could be studied on people, with the added benefit that it would cost nothing to maintain human beings.

The importance of the Advisory Council's action cannot be overstated, because it is far more than the rejection of a single grant application -- it represents the unanimous viewpoint of NIA peer review that it will NEVER fund any large-scale project for supporting aging chimpanzees. Considering the $30+ million in long-term liability that TCF has for the chimps it already owns (without owning a single Air Force chimp), it is quite possible that only a large-scale project, such as that rejected out of hand by the NIA, can save TCF from long-term financial ruin. According to IDA's sources, TCF was clearly counting on this aging center money for its long-term financial survival. It is also important to note that TCF failed in its attempt last year to obtain a special Congressional appropriation for this aging center (TCF's lobbying efforts for this appropriation were reported in the February 4, 1997 New York Times and the June 29, 1997 Dallas Morning News), and the Advisory Council minutes also mention discussions with Congressional staff who had encouraged NIA to fund an aging chimpanzee research center.

C. TCF's Apparent Loss of Private Drug Company Contracts

According to IDA's sources, TCF has lost private drug company contracts because of its animal care problems, extraordinary veterinary turnover, etc. IDA has been informed by three separate, very reliable sources that one of these companies was Chiron Corp., the $3 billion Emeryville, California-based company that is the world's second-largest biotechnology firm (after Amgen) and one-half owned by Novartis, the world's largest drug company. According to IDA's sources, Chiron pulled at least one major contract from TCF because of animal care/welfare concerns (IDA has not confirmed this with Chiron). Not only would such a loss indicate yet more financial pressure on TCF, but would also call into serious question any decision by the Air Force to award any chimps to TCF. If Chiron, a major private drug company half-owned by the world's largest drug firm, pulled at least one major contract from TCF because of animal care/welfare concerns, how could the Air Force possibly justify awarding any chimps to TCF considering its own RFP's strict animal care criteria as well as Congress' intent that the recipient of the chimps provide "adequate care"? How could the Air Force possibly explain to Congress that even though a major drug company apparently pulled a contract because of animal care/welfare concerns, the Air Force went ahead and awarded chimps to TCF? Are a private drug company's standards for animal care and welfare higher than Congress', the Air Force's or the USDA's? It is also important to note that, by definition, drug company studies are funded for a finite period of several months or several years. If a private drug company pulled a contract, scheduled for a finite period of time, because of animal care/welfare concerns, how could the Air Force possibly justify giving permanent ownership -- for the next 30-40 years, not for several months or several years -- to the very same facility, especially in light of Congress' intent and the RFP's strict animal care criteria, which includes compliance with the Animal Welfare Act? As you know, the USDA has filed an unprecedented two sets of formal charges against TCF for multiple violations of the AWA; the current set, filed March 19, 1998, is still pending.

D. TCF's Inaccurate Claims Regarding a Prostate Research Grant

In two recent stories in the Alamogordo Daily News (May and June, 1998), TCF claimed that it has received a $1.9 million grant to study benign prostate hypertrophy. In reality, we have been informed that TCF did not receive this grant (nor is it the first time TCF has misrepresented its work). The performing institution is the University of Tennessee-Memphis; the Principal Investigator is UT-Memphis's Dr. Mitchell S. Steiner. TCF's inaccurate claims are important because they have direct relevance to funding. If TCF was the performing institution and received the grant -- and remember, TCF does not have a single peer-reviewed, investigator-initiated NIH grant in any field of scientific research -- then it would be eligible for both direct and indirect (overhead) funds from NIH. However, because TCF is essentially a subcontractor for UT-Memphis, it will receive no such indirect funds, which can account for 50-75% of a grant's total funds. Therefore, the vast majority of funds received by TCF will simply be to support the limited number of chimps on the study -- hardly enough money to make a dent in the overwhelming long-term financial liability of having to sustain a 500+ chimpanzee colony for the next 30-40 years. $1.9 million may sound like a lot of money, but it is really not if one considers that (1) TCF is not the performing institution, and (2) this money will be spread over several years (the most common grant periods are 3-5 years). If this is a five-year grant, with 75% overhead going to UT-Memphis, then the direct yearly costs would be approximately $250,000. As explained below, TCF would only receive a part of those direct costs.

Moreover, it is highly likely that the chimpanzee work is only a part of Dr. Steiner's grant, which would dilute even more any funds that could go to TCF. If you want to know the truth about this grant, including how much of its funds are truly scheduled to go to TCF, we suggest that you contact NIH (we have been unable to obtain such information).

E. Movement Away from the Use of Chimps in Research/Questions Regarding TCF's NIH Funding

Clearly, the scientific community has recognized that there is currently a surplus of chimpanzees in labs. This surplus has been caused by several factors, including the huge cost of maintaining chimps for research; the failure of the chimp AIDS model; overbreeding; and ethical constraints. For many of these reasons, scientists have moved away from using chimps in research, thus increasing the financial pressure on TCF, which currently controls almost one-half of the U.S. chimp population (and owns outright approximately one-third). The 1997 National Academy of Sciences ILAR report on chimpanzees in research recognized the problem of a chimp surplus, which is why it recommended a five-year breeding moratorium. However, according to IDA's sources, TCF is still breeding chimps, which will only add to its already-overwhelming long-term financial liability. The ILAR report, as well as NIA Deputy Director Dr. Terry Wetle, also recognized that one of the major reasons scientists do not use chimps is the huge cost associated with maintaining them (references available upon request). This is perhaps the single biggest reason that facilities other than TCF want to retire and/or divest themselves of chimps. This viewpoint, and corresponding questions raised by TCF's attempts to gain even more chimps, are evidenced by comments made by Yerkes Director Dr. Thomas Insel in the February 4, 1997 New York Times, in which he stated he was "amazed" that anyone would be "trying to expand a chimp empire," since Yerkes was, and is, looking to reduce its chimp population. Similar sentiments were voiced three years ago in U.S. News & World Report by Peter Gerone, Director of the Tulane Regional Primate Research Center, who stated that if someone offered him 100 chimps for free, he would say "no thanks."

The huge cost of maintaining chimps will be even more problematic with few or no research funds for support -- but that is the likely outlook for TCF. It has apparently lost private drug company contracts. NIA not only rejected its grant application, but slammed the door forever on perhaps the only kind of project that can save TCF from long-term financial ruin: supporting a large-scale chimp aging program. Moreover, in light of the scientific consensus regarding a chimp surplus as well as the ILAR report, can TCF count on the level of support it currently has from NIH for chimpanzee breeding, or for that matter maintaining HIV-infected chimps? In light of the apparent loss of private drug company contracts and the NIA's devastating rejection, TCF is apparently surviving because of its contracts with NIH and FDA to breed chimps and maintain HIV-infected chimps.

For its breeding contracts, TCF receives approximately $2 million yearly from NIH and FDA (from 1995 through the year 2000, TCF is scheduled to receive $8.8 million from the NCRR Chimpanzee Breeding and Research Program, while the FDA/CDC contract pays TCF approximately $55,000 per chimp). These funds represent by far TCF's largest yearly monies from NIH/FDA. If there is a chimp surplus, and if the ILAR report recommended a five-year breeding moratorium, can TCF prove that NIH will continue chimp breeding funding at its current levels when the NCRR contract expires in 2000? In addition, because the chimp AIDS model has not panned out, can TCF prove that it will continue to receive funding support at its current levels when its NIAID and NCI/SAID contracts for maintaining HIV-infected chimps expire early next year? Again, the RFP's strict financial criteria mandate a thorough financial audit, which should include definitive answers to these questions.

In addition, the office of Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) is looking into allegations that TCF may have overcharged the government on its NIH subcontract to maintain HIV-infected chimpanzees; the staff member in charge of the inquiry is Mark Guiton. Rep. Maloney's office is also aware of the unprecedented two sets of formal USDA charges against TCF; TCF's April 22, 1998 loss of a Title 7 sexual harassment lawsuit; and has documentation relating to TCF's potentially improper and illegal use of government funds for private studies. If Rep. Maloney's office finds sufficient evidence of improper use of taxpayer money by TCF, it is possible that TCF's NIH funds could be suspended. Such a suspension would clearly cripple TCF's financial outlook, both short- and long-term, and would certainly negatively impact on the care and welfare of any Air Force chimps awarded to it.

Moreover, another indication of TCF's potentially precarious financial position can be seen in another aspect of Rep. Maloney's inquiry. According to documents IDA obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, TCF may have overcharged the government, in part by potentially inflating personnel needed to maintain HIV-infected chimps. TCF claimed that it needed the equivalent of 12 full-time technical and support personnel, and 3.6 full-time professionals, to care for 24 chimps during the period April 1996 through March 1997. Chimp experts consulted by IDA have stated that these personnel claims are inflated, especially considering the sheer size of TCF's operation -- over 600 chimps and 450 monkeys. TCF is claiming that it needs the equivalent of one full-time technical and support person to care for two chimps, in a 600-chimp and 450-monkey facility. In addition, it is important to note that the vast majority of TCF's contribution in this contract is not science, but simply to maintain the chimps, and occasionally draw blood, perform medical tests, etc. It is also important to note that the standard rule-of-thumb at NIH is approximately one caretaker for every 15 chimps, which would fall under "technical and support" personnel. Yet a May 1994 NIH site visit report found that TCF had only one caretaker for every 33 chimps. Although that ratio has no doubt improved, has it to the point of one for every two chimps? These very questionable staffing claims raise this fundamental question: is TCF inflating its personnel claims, and using the money obtained from NIH to subsidize its other operations?

Please be advised that Rep. Maloney has documentary evidence showing just that: that TCF has used government funds to subsidize its private operations. Such evidence, combined with the other evidence referenced above, calls into question whether or not TCF will have continued NIH funding, at least at its current levels.

We believe that the evidence clearly shows that TCF simply cannot prove -- either to the satisfaction of the RFP criteria or to Congressional intent -- that it has the guaranteed financial resources to care for Air Force chimpanzees for the next 30-40 years. It is clear that the financial pressures on TCF described above will only be exacerbated because of the huge expense of maintaining chimpanzees, and TCF's ownership right now -- without a single Air Force chimp -- of approximately one-third of the entire U.S. chimp population.

We believe it is also important to note that the RFP criteria and Congressional intent must not and cannot be ignored simply because the Air Force wants to dispose of this matter as expeditiously as possible. If TCF -- or, for that matter, any other bidder -- cannot meet the strict financial, animal care and other criteria outlined by the RFP, and mandated by Congressional intent, then the Air Force must delay this process, or even start it over, until bidder(s) can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they have the financial and other capabilities necessary to ensure "adequate care" for the chimps -- for a time period that can last as long as 40 years. The importance of this cannot be overstated -- the Air Force simply cannot attempt to wash its hands of the chimps, and of Congressional intent, by failing to adhere strictly to its own RFP criteria. Any failure to follow those criteria -- whether it is for TCF or any other bidder -- will be easily proved. It is therefore especially troubling to hear from our sources that, in early June of this year, Air Force officials were at Holloman Air Force base measuring the new $10.5 million chimp housing buildings. (The Air Force claims it does not own those buildings, but that will be discussed later.) According to our sources, when these officials were asked why they were taking measurements, they responded that they were attempting to determine the best way to raze the buildings -- which are little more than five years old, and paid for with $10.5 million in public funds. Please be advised that, if this is true, we will use any and every means at our disposal to prevent such an action. (Such an action also makes us wonder how the Air Force could destroy buildings it claims it does not own.) This incident, if true, also heightens our concern that the Air Force will ignore its own strict criteria, as well as Congressional intent, and award the chimps to bidders, such as TCF, which we believe clearly cannot meet the RFP criteria, Congressional intent, or even comply with minimal federal Animal Welfare Act standards. The Air Force cannot simply award the chimps to inappropriate bidders, and raze buildings it claims it doesn't even own so that it can neatly "solve" its "chimp problem" in one fell swoop.

2. TCF'S Unprecidented Record of Negligent Animal Care

A. USDA's Current Official Investigation into Yet More Chimp Deaths

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the federal agency responsible for enforcing the Animal Welfare Act, is once again investigating the facility for more chimpanzee deaths. This can be confirmed by contacting Dr. Robert Gibbens, USDA's Western Regional Director (916-857-6205). In fact, IDA's sources state that USDA investigators were at TCF just last week, on July 15-17, 1998. An official USDA investigation only occurs after a preliminary investigation finds enough evidence to warrant a full-blown official investigation. Then, USDA's investigative arm, Investigative and Enforcement Services (IES), is called in. If information from our sources is accurate, the chimp deaths being investigated occurred in 1998, some within the past month. To IDA's knowledge, USDA's new investigation of TCF has set yet another precedent: We are aware of no other registered research facility in the 32-year history of the Animal Welfare Act that has had USDA officially investigate yet more animal deaths while current formal USDA charges for negligent deaths are still pending.

B. The Formal USDA Charges of March 19, 1998

On March 19, 1998, the USDA took the unprecedented step of filing a second set of formal charges against TCF for multiple violations of the AWA (the first set, filed on July 6, 1995, will be explained below). The 9-page, 24-count complaint included charges relating to the negligent, entirely preventable deaths of two young, healthy chimpanzees (Jello and Echo) in 1997; numerous physical plant and sanitary deficiencies; and perhaps the single most serious charge ever filed against a registered research facility: the broad, facility-wide charge that TCF failed to "establish and maintain programs of adequate veterinary care, including procedures and equipment for emergency care." Such a broad charge, coupled with TCF's documented history of "unintended" chimpanzee deaths and multiple violations of the AWA, directly relate to this facility's ability to meet the RFP's strict animal care criteria as well as Congress' intent that the recipient of the chimps provide "adequate care."

In light of those strict RFP and Congressional requirements, it is extremely important to note the history-making nature of this second set of formal USDA charges, which is currently still pending. If one uses formal USDA charges as a benchmark, then TCF has the worst documented animal care record of any registered research facility in the 32-year history of the Animal Welfare Act. According to Alan Christian of IES, from 1992 through April 9, 1998, the USDA filed 313 formal complaints under the Animal Welfare Act. Of those 313 complaints, only 18 were filed against registered research facilities -- indicating that only the most serious of charges (after thorough investigation and multiple levels of review) make it to formal complaint status. In addition, as USDA spokesperson Robin Porter stated in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (May 3, 1998, from an April 1998 story in the Los Angeles Times), "What probably does not bode well for the Coulston Foundation is the problem continues." This is clearly evidenced by the current official IES investigation into yet more chimp deaths at TCF -- including deaths that occurred within the past month.

It is extremely important to remember that TCF is the only facility in the history of the AWA that has had two sets of formal charges filed against it for violations involving negligent animal deaths. To put it another way: Fully 11% of all of USDA's formal complaints against registered research facilities for the past six years were filed against TCF.

How can the Air Force possibly consider awarding a single Air Force chimpanzee to a facility with such a record -- a record of violations, negligence and death that apparently continues unabated? How can the Air Force possibly believe that the this facility can meet either of the strict criteria regarding animal care or financial capability -- which are inherent in Congressional intent -- let alone both of these vital requirements?

We believe it is also important to note that TCF management has repeatedly failed to take responsibility for negligent animal deaths that were entirely its responsibility. In 1995, TCF management attempted to blame New Mexico State University for the overheating deaths of three chimps in late 1993 (deaths which formed the heart of the July 6, 1995 charges against TCF), despite the fact that TCF had signed a legally binding contract with NMSU that clearly stated that as of July 1, 1993 -- four months before the chimps died -- TCF was entirely responsible for day-to-day care of the Holloman facility where the chimps died. More recently, TCF management publicly attempted to blame New York University for the death of a chimpanzee named Panda, despite the fact that Panda had (1) been at TCF for several weeks before her death, and was clinically healthy upon arrival, and (2) died of a Shigella outbreak at TCF that had been characterized in a July 31, 1997 USDA inspection report as a "public health risk" as well as constituting violations of the Animal Welfare Act (the sanitary deficiencies found in this inspection were included in the March 19, 1998 formal charges). The USDA found no such Shigella outbreak at the NYU lab that had transferred Panda to TCF. In fact, it should also be noted that, almost three months after Panda's death, TCF management publicly claimed that it still did not know her cause of death. This of course raises even more questions regarding TCF's preventive veterinary care and pathology program.

Moreover, in the March 28, 1998 Albuquerque Journal, TCF P.R. Director Don McKinney stated that the March 19, 1998 formal USDA charges against TCF are based on the "findings of one inspector." McKinney repeated this claim in the March 29, 1998 Alamogordo Daily News ("The findings were filed by one inspector") and the May 1998 Lab Animal ("McKinney says the allegations are the 'findings of one inspector'").

In its attempts to deflect attention and responsibility from these unprecedented and extremely serious charges, TCF management seems unable or unwilling to deal in facts. The USDA charges are far, far more than the "findings of one inspector," and we have little doubt that TCF management knows it, since it saw first-hand (both in 1994/1995 and in 1997) what it actually takes for USDA to take the highly unusual and highly serious step of filing formal charges against a registered research facility. TCF management has repeatedly seen what is entailed in the process of USDA's filing formal charges.

First, USDA inspectors conduct a preliminary investigation, to determine if there is enough evidence to warrant a full-blown investigation. If so, USDA upgrades the investigation to "official" status, and calls in its investigative arm -- Investigative and Enforcement Services (IES). IES investigators (not inspectors) then conduct an official inquiry, gathering evidence, obtaining documents, interviewing staff, consulting with experts, etc. IES then issues a report, which is forwarded to the USDA Regional Office. The Regional Office then reviews the IES report; if violations were found, with evidence to back them up, and only if the Regional Office agrees with the IES findings, then the investigation is sent to the USDA Office of General Counsel (OGC). OGC will only file charges if there is evidence to back them up -- evidence that, in TCF's case, must surely be overwhelming, since this was the first time in the history of the Animal Welfare Act that USDA filed a second set of formal charges against the same registered research facility for multiple violations involving negligent animal deaths. However, the multiple levels of USDA scrutiny and review (inspector, IES, Regional Office, OGC) are still not complete; the formal charges must also be approved by the APHIS Administrator. Only after these multiple levels of investigation, evidence-gathering, consultation, review and approval are charges filed. However, despite these facts, TCF management continues to evade responsibility for its documented animal care record. If TCF management refuses to admit that there are any problems, how can it possibly correct the serious deficiencies found by USDA in its unprecedented actions of (1) filing a second set of formal charges on March 19, 1998, and (2) officially investigating yet more chimp deaths while those charges are still pending?

Indeed, as the evidence demonstrates, the March 19, 1998 USDA charges against TCF were far, far more than the "findings of one inspector," and clearly demonstrate serious, continuing violations of minimal animal care standards at TCF. However, TCF management refuses to acknowledge that any problems even exist. This is exemplified by its official response to the current formal charges.

In that response, TCF makes what can only be described as incredible assertions. Besides denying all of the USDA charges, TCF actually questions USDA's very authority to bring them, despite the fact that Congress has given USDA the statutory responsibility of enforcing the Animal Welfare Act. Some of TCF's almost laughable legal "arguments" include the claim that TCF's nonprofit status makes it immune from civil penalty, or that because the violations were not intentional, then the USDA also cannot impose a civil penalty (the Animal Welfare Act in no way prevents the bringing of charges against nonprofit institutions, nor does it require intent to violate the Act).

But perhaps the most shameless of TCF's claims involves its characterization of its history of compliance with the AWA. TCF actually states that USDA's actions in bringing charges are "arbitrary and capricious" considering TCF's "history of regulatory compliance" -- and then goes on to repeat this incredible claim, stating that even if the USDA allegations are true, then TCF should be immune from a civil penalty because of its "excellent compliance history"!

Talk about revisionist history -- not to mention circular "logic." In its official reply to the USDA charges, in which it questions USDA's very authority to bring a legal complaint, TCF actually states not once, but twice, that its "history of regulatory compliance"/"excellent compliance history" (1) makes USDA's actions "arbitrary and capricious" (as if the USDA did not have any evidence to back up the charges, after multiple levels of investigation, review, consultation, etc.), and (2) makes TCF immune from a civil penalty, even if USDA's allegations are true (which of course begs the question: if USDA's allegations are true, how could TCF have an "excellent compliance history"?)!

Yet TCF has the nerve to claim not once, but twice, that its "history of regulatory compliance"/"excellent compliance history" makes USDA's filing of the second set of formal charges "arbitrary and capricious, and should make it immune from civil penalty even if the charges are true!

But are they true? The proof is clearly in the charges as well as the USDA investigative case file, which we strongly encourage the Air Force to obtain from USDA (because the case is still pending, the case file is unavailable to the public, but should be available through an interagency request from the Air Force to USDA). IDA has repeatedly provided to USDA overwhelming evidence of TCF's multiple violations and negligence involved in the deaths of both Echo and Jello, as well as serious questions relating to TCF's entire animal care and use program. We would be happy to provide the Air Force with this evidence. In addition, it is our opinion, considering the grave nature of the latest set of charges, as well as the fact that this was the first time in history that it was filing a second set of charges against the same facility for negligent animal deaths, that USDA would not have touched these latest charges with a ten-foot pole unless it had overwhelming evidence to back them up. But, once again, TCF management refuses to acknowledge responsibility for its violations and negligence resulting in the deaths of young, healthy chimps, or accept the documented facts. How, then, can TCF management correct documented problems it refuses even to acknowledge? This directly relates to the RFP's strict animal care criteria, as well as Congress' intent for "adequate care."

C. Chiron's Apparent Departure from TCF Because of Animal Care/Welfare Concerns

As stated above, we have been informed by reliable sources that Chiron Corp. has pulled at least one major contract from TCF because of animal care/welfare concerns. We have detailed above the extremely serious questions raised by such an apparent action. If our information about Chiron is true, how could the Air Force possibly consider awarding a single Air Force chimp -- forever -- to TCF, if a private drug company pulled at least one major contract -- for testing of a finite duration -- because of TCF's animal care record? How could such an Air Force action possibly be consistent with the strict RFP animal care criteria as well as Congress' mandate that the recipient of the Air Force chimps provide them with "adequate care," especially in light of the USDA's unprecedented action of filing two separate formal complaints against TCF for negligent animal deaths?

D. The July 6, 1995 USDA charges

On July 6, 1995, the USDA filed its first set of formal charges against TCF for multiple violations of the AWA, including the overheating deaths of three chimpanzees, the water deprivation deaths of four monkeys, and numerous chimp cage size violations. TCF settled these charges in June 1996 by agreeing to pay a $40,000 fine -- at the time, the second-largest in the history of the AWA -- and, more importantly, promising to cease and desist from violating the AWA. However, only months later, chimps at TCF began to die once again from abject negligence, as evidenced by the March 19, 1998 charges.

E. Concerns About TCF'S IACUC Membership and Functioning

As the Air Force knows, IACUCs were established by the 1985 Amendment to the AWA to provide enhanced oversight to ensure the humane care and use of animals in research, and also to protect the public's clear interest in ensuring this goal (hence the public member of the IACUC). The IACUC reviews and approves all research involving animals, is supposed to ensure their humane care and use, and is supposed to inspect the facility at least twice a year and also investigate any complaints of animal mistreatment or other violations of the Animal Welfare Act.

However, IDA has discovered that the so-called "public member" of TCF's IACUC -- most likely for several years -- was a vice-president of First National Bank of Alamogordo -- the bank where TCF does much of its business, and where TCF has several outstanding loans. Proof of such outstanding loans can be found in a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) search that IDA conducted last year of New Mexico state public records. This search, available upon request, shows that the clear majority of TCF's and Coulston companies' UCC Financing Statements/Loans were with First National Bank of Alamogordo as the Secured Party.

Section 2.31(b)(3) of the 9 CFR, Code of Federal Regulations governing AWA states this about the IACUC's "public member":

IDA believes that the conflict of interest is clear, as well as the violation of the spirit if not the letter of the Animal Welfare Act regulations regarding IACUCs. The "public member" of TCF's IACUC was a vice-president of the bank where TCF conducts much of its business, and where TCF has several outstanding loans. Not only is there probably a friendly personal relationship, but also a very compromising business relationship that we believe is a clear conflict of interest. For example, First National Bank of Alamogordo has a vested interest in getting its money back from TCF. What if a protocol reviewed by the IACUC is highly questionable regarding humane care and use of animals -- e.g., the monkey Draize test of a cleaning compound that Coulston toxicologist Ronald Couch conducted (spraying the compound in monkey's eyes) in late 1993 -- but will pay good money. Considering First National's vested interest in getting the money back that it loaned to TCF, whose interests will win out -- the animals' or the bank's? Will such a vested interest approve of a thorough investigation of any complaints, which may adversely affect TCF's financial bottom line? And how can the bank vice-president's membership possibly fulfill the regulatory and Congressional intent of the public member's providing "representation for general community interests in the proper care and treatment of animals"? Does this not also add to the evidence mandating questions regarding TCF's ability to ensure the humane care and use of any Air Force chimpanzees?

In fact, sources have informed IDA that when USDA discovered this bank vice-president's membership, the agency forced TCF to appoint a new public member.

This last piece is information is very important, because, if true, it would not have been the first time that a government agency had to step in and force IACUC membership changes in order to ensure that the purpose behind the IACUC's very existence was not being compromised. At one time Fred Coulston -- TCF's Chairman and CEO -- was a voting member of his own IACUC! The May 1994 NIH site visitors were very disturbed by this -- as well as the absence of any staff who managed and care for the chimp colonies (even in 1994, TCF was the largest chimp colony in the world). IDA believes that is extremely telling that TCF had on its IACUC no staff who actually cared for the chimps in the world's largest chimp colony; again, we believe this calls into serious question TCF's adherence to the spirit if not the letter of the IACUC's very purpose, and, consequently, this facility's ability to meet the strict RFP criteria as well as Congress' intent to provide "adequate care" to the Air Force chimps.

Like USDA's purported actions in forcing TCF to remove the bank vice-president as the "public member," only after NIH pressured Coulston did he take himself off his own IACUC. Like the bank vice-president's membership, Coulston's membership -- as a voting member -- of his own IACUC is a clear conflict of interest, and perverts the very intent of the IACUC's purpose. In addition, it should be noted that recent USDA inspection reports have repeatedly found problems with the functioning and regulatory compliance of TCF's IACUC.

Here is what the May 1994 site visit report stated about Coulston's membership and the lack of a chimpanzee colony staffer -- at the world's largest chimp colony -- on the TCF IACUC:

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:...

Changes in the composition of the TCF IACUC are strongly recommended. First, it is inappropriate for the Chairman of the Board and Chief Operating Officer, Dr. Coulston, to be a voting member of the IACUC. PHS Animal Welfare Policy seeks to bring a balance of varying viewpoints to bear on IACUC deliberations and decisions by requiring veterinary, lay, scientific and non-affiliated members. This balance is jeopardized by the potential for undue influence by the power and position of the CEO as a voting IACUC member. Second, the site visitors noted a lack of representation on the IACUC from the chimpanzee veterinary care and management elements of TCF. It is felt that this input would enable the integration of animal care and use program management with IACUC functioning and enhance the overall program. The IACUC composition should be reevaluated and changes made for improved functioning.

Do not these serious, documented instances of TCF's violation of the spirit if not the letter of the IACUC's very purpose -- the intent of which is clear from the regulations and the 1985 AWA Amendment's Congressional legislative history -- call into serious TCF's ability to meet another Congressional intent, namely that the Air Force chimps must be provided "adequate care"?

3. EXTRAORDINARY VETERINARY AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL STAFF TURNOVER

A. July 1998 Departure of Dr. Allan Manus

As Col. Blackhurst stated in the December 30, 1997 Wall Street Journal, TCF's state of veterinary flux has been a major concern. Well, the flux continues unabated; another veterinarian has just left TCF. On or about July 6, 1998, TCF Associate Director of Veterinary Sciences Dr. Allan G. Manus, an ACLAM-accredited veterinarian, tendered his resignation and gave his notice, making him the 12th veterinarian to leave TCF since May 1994. Six of those 12 have left since February 1997, including the vet described in a May 1994 NIH site visit report as the "sole remaining" vet at TCF with the necessary training and experience to manage a large chimp colony. As you can see, the staffing turmoil that has direct and adverse impact on both the RFP's stringent animal care requirements, and Congress' intent that the recipient of the Air Force chimps provide "adequate care," continues. IDA challenges the Air Force to find any registered research facility that even approaches this professional staff turnover rate, which includes not only 12 veterinarians, but also 3 on-site pathologists, TCF's Director of Psychological Enrichment and TCF's vice-president/legal counsel. This extraordinary turnover has direct relevance to this facility's ability to meet the strict animal care criteria of the RFP, Congress' intent and the minimum standards of the Animal Welfare Act, and also calls into serious question any credible continuity of veterinary care at TCF. This extreme lack of continuity and clinical chimp experience is exemplified by TCF's "musical chairs" regarding its Principal Investigators (all of whom have been veterinarians). For example, in the span of approximately 17 months, TCF has now had four different Principal Investigators on its chimpanzee breeding contracts with NIH and FDA, which are worth upwards of $2 million yearly to TCF: Dr. Pat Frost, Dr. Chandra Williams, Dr. Allan Manus and whoever will replace Dr. Manus. How can such extraordinary turnover not affect the quality of care for Air Force chimps for the next 30-40 years? How many more vets will leave TCF during that time, and who will be left even to take a position at the facility? Indeed, the current USDA charges are clearly indicative of this extraordinary turnover, and the resulting clinical chimp inexperience of those vets hired to replace the departed, experienced vets.

Indeed, TCF has hired as replacements veterinarians who were extremely inexperienced with clinical chimp care. This inexperience, and the dangers it clearly poses to both the short- and long-term welfare of the chimps, are exemplified by the death of a healthy two-year-old chimp named Echo in March 1997. As the Air Force knows, the USDA found multiple violations of the AWA involved in Echo's death. Of the three veterinarians who operated on Echo (and failed to pre-surgically stabilize her shock, as mentioned in the charges), all were recent graduates of veterinary school (one had graduated in 1995, two in 1996). Two of the vets had, at most, seven months clinical chimp experience; the third had approximately two months. Yet these inexperienced, recently graduated vets performed a delicate four-hour operation on a young, traumatized chimpanzee who never should have been in surgery because she was in shock. Two of these three veterinarians are still at TCF; to IDA's knowledge, they currently comprise approximately one-half of TCF's clinical veterinary staff (after the departure of Dr. Manus). How can such an inexperienced chimp staff possibly meet the RFP criteria or Congress' intent that the chimps be provided "adequate care" -- care that has been found by USDA to be seriously deficient and to constitute multiple violations of the AWA, including the facility-wide charge that TCF failed to "establish and maintain programs of adequate veterinary care"?

Moreover, on July 8, 1998 -- two days after Dr. Manus tendered his resignation -- TCF president Travis Griffin advertised on CompMed, an Internet mailing list for lab animal professionals, that a position for a "Clinical Veterinarian/Postdoctoral Fellow" was available at TCF. The notice mentioned that "recent graduates and graduates with 1 - 2 years of experience are encouraged to apply," and that a DVM or "equivalent" training was required (emphases added; full text of ad available upon request). By definition, post-docs, recent graduates or graduates with "1 - 2 years of experience" are inexperienced. How can such a person or persons possibly help correct TCF's serious deficiencies in experienced clinical chimpanzee veterinary staff? As stated above, TCF's lack of adequately experienced chimpanzee clinicians and its continued staffing turmoil directly and negatively affects the "adequate care" required by both Congress and the Air Force RFP. How can such advertising for such inexperienced vets possibly be consistent with the strict animal care criteria of the RFP and Congressional intent?

B. History of TCF's Veterinary and Other Professional Staffing Departures, TCF's Broken Promises Regarding its Staffing, and the Dire Impact on Animal Care

As stated above, since May 1994, 12 veterinarians with over 60 years combined clinical chimp experience have left TCF -- by far the world's largest captive chimp colony -- only to be replaced by veterinarians with extremely limited clinical chimp experience. TCF management's continued failure to retain experienced chimp vets, and to replace them with very inexperienced chimp vets, relates directly to the March 19, 1998 formal USDA charge that TCF failed to "establish and maintain programs of adequate veterinary care, including procedures and equipment for emergency care" -- the single most serious charge ever filed against a registered research facility, indicating fundamental, facility-wide animal care violations and deficiencies that we believe continue to this day (as evidenced by the USDA's current official IES investigation into yet more chimp deaths at TCF).

The following is a list of the 12 veterinarians who have left TCF since May 1994, as well as some additional information regarding some of them.

• Dr. Bill Cummins (former Chief of Veterinary Sciences, over 20 years clinical chimp experience; currently at Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research, San Antonio, Texas)
• Dr. Robert Eason (over 25 years experience)
• Dr. Bruce Preston
• Dr. Sheri Vaughn
• Dr. Gary Sibert (also a veterinary pathologist)
• Dr. Mike Albersmeyer (over 20 years experience)
• Dr. Pat Frost (8-10 years clinical chimp experience; last known location, TNO chimp colony, The Netherlands)

NOTE: We believe that the departure of Dr. Frost -- by far TCF's most experienced remaining chimp clinician -- marked a new low in TCF's deteriorating animal care program. A May 26, 1994 NIH on-site visit report stated the following about TCF's animal care program and Dr. Frost (entire report available upon request):

It is important to note that the NIH on-site visitors regarded Dr. Frost as not only highly qualified, but also "the sole remaining veterinarian with an appropriate level of training and experience in the management and clinical care of a major chimpanzee resource." Significantly, the NIH site visit report was prepared in May 1994, before ten other veterinarians (excluding Dr. Cummins, who left just prior to this report) -- who had decades of combined clinical chimp experience -- left TCF. Dr. Eason, also now long gone, along with Dr. Frost accompanied the NIH officials during their on-site visit.

It is also important to note that this May 1994 NIH on-site visit report, and its highly complimentary remarks about Dr. Frost as well as the deficiencies in staffing of the Veterinary Sciences Division, were made before TCF had taken on the additional responsibility of 100 chimps from the Laboratory for Experimental Medicine and Surgery in Primates (sent to TCF in 1996/1997); before TCF took on the additional responsibility of 21 Air-Force owned chimps that had been housed at the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research (sent to TCF in February and March, 1998 -- only weeks before USDA filed its March 19, 1998 second set of formal charges against TCF); and before all of TCF's most-experienced chimp vets had left, including the one (Dr. Frost) described by NIH as the "sole remaining vet" at TCF with the necessary training and experience to run a large chimpanzee colony. Of course, this report also occurred before the birth of new chimps during the last four years at TCF. TCF has not come close to replacing the experience, expertise and training of Dr. Frost; instead, since her departure, it has lost even more vets (5), including one (Dr. Manus) who had purportedly been hired to help replace her.

Moreover, throughout the May 1994 report -- again, before all of TCF's most-experienced chimp vets had left -- the NIH site visitors repeatedly remark on the need for TCF to increase staffing, particularly in the Veterinary Sciences Division, and that the current staffing levels -- even with the very experienced, very competent Dr. Pat Frost -- were "inadequate for an efficient and well-managed operation" ("the staffing of the Veterinary Sciences Division for the support of NCI and NCRR programs is inadequate for an efficient and well-managed operation.")

As stated above, the NIH site visitors wrote that TCF officials "acknowledg[e] a need for further progress to improve staffing, particularly in the Veterinary Sciences Division"; that "Management should follow through on its expressed commitment to Dr. Frost by providing human and other resources required for her to perform her duties as principal investigator on the NCI and NCRR contracts"; that "It is essential that a highly-qualified and experienced individual be recruited to head the Veterinary Sciences Division as soon as possible. The individual should be a senior veterinarian with extensive experience in nonhuman primate care and institutional animal care and use program management"; and that "Staffing of the Veterinary Sciences Division is a major concern."

These views regarding the need for increased veterinary staffing were repeated by TCF's own paid consultant. In a June 30, 1995 on-site visit report -- requested and paid for by TCF, and more than one year after the NIH site visit -- the consultant wrote the following on page 9 ("Conclusions"):

Again, note that the consultant's report, like the May 1994 NIH on-site report, recognizes the need for enhanced veterinary staffing. Like the NIH report, this report -- requested and paid for by TCF -- was written before TCF took on the additional responsibility of 121 chimps from LEMSIP and the Southwest Foundation, and before all of TCF's most-experienced chimp vets had left. It of course also does not take into account the birth of new chimps at TCF during the last three years.

In fact, TCF never followed through on NIH's strong recommendation that "It is essential that a highly-qualified and experienced individual be recruited to head the Veterinary Sciences Division as soon as possible. The individual should be a senior veterinarian with extensive experience in nonhuman primate care and institutional animal care and use program management." Nor did TCF increase veterinary staffing, as strongly recommended by both the NIH site visitors and TCF's own paid consultant. Instead, TCF has lost 12 chimp clinicians with over 60 years of combined clinical chimp experience since May 1994 -- with 6 of the 12 leaving since Dr. Frost's departure February 1997 (including Dr. Frost). How can any TCF promises made to the Air Force in its bid possibly be believed considering the trail of broken promises regarding its vet staffing? In fact, as we will explain below, TCF has repeatedly failed to fulfill legally binding contractual obligations, including obligations directly related to Coulston's response to an RFP for transfer of the NMSU chimpanzee colony to TCF.

In addition, also note that even with the experienced and competent Dr. Frost at TCF, as well as other experienced chimp clinicians such as Drs. Albersmeyer, Eason, Sibert, Vaughn (all of whom have left TCF), the NIH site visitors reported that TCF's animal care and use program failed to meet the minimum standards of the NIH Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals: "The first priority for TCF and the Veterinary Sciences Division should be the development of a comprehensive plan to achieve a consolidated animal care and use program that meets the standards of the NIH Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals." As both sets of formal USDA charges clearly show -- especially the March 19, 1998 charges, which include TCF's failure to "establish and maintain programs of adequate veterinary care, including procedures and equipment for emergency care" -- TCF has also failed to comply with this most basic, fundamental recommendation of simply having an adequate veterinary care program that meets the minimal standards of the NIH Guide. If TCF could not meet these standards with experienced, competent chimp clinicians like Dr. Frost et al, how can it possibly meet them today, after 12 veterinarians, with over 60 years of combined clinical chimp experience, have left TCF -- 6 since February 1997, only to be replaced by veterinarians extremely inexperienced, by comparison, in clinical chimp care? The March 19, 1998 formal USDA charges -- as well as the current official IES investigation into yet more chimp deaths at TCF -- clearly answer that question: TCF has not, and can not.

TCF vets who left after Dr. Frost:

• Dr. Chandra Williams (left TCF in July 1997; 4 years of clinical chimp experience; after Dr. Frost's departure, TCF's most-experienced chimp clinician);
• Dr. Brit Oiulfstad (left TCF in August 1997; approximately 6 months clinical chimp experience);
• Dr. Keith Jenne (left TCF in June 1997; approximately 10 months clinical chimp experience);
• Dr. Pam Mack (left TCF in February 1998; approximately 2 years clinical chimp experience, ACLAM-accredited).
• Dr. Allan G. Manus (left TCF July 1998; approximately 1 year clinical chimp experience; Associate Director of TCF's Division of Veterinary Sciences; ACLAM-accredited).

Such extraordinary staffing turnover has direct relevance to the compliance with the RFP's animal care criteria; federal animal welfare laws; and Congress' intent for "adequate care" for the chimps. How can such extraordinary turnover, and the resulting clinical chimp inexperience of TCF's replacement vets, not affect the quality and continuity of animal care for the Air Force chimps?

Moreover, TCF's extraordinary veterinary and other professional staffing departures are a continuing problem, as evidenced by the recent departures of Dr. Manus as well as TCF's vice-president/legal counsel. It is no coincidence that 12 veterinarians, 3 on-site pathologists, its Enrichment Director and its vice-president have left since May 1994. The chimp vet community is an extremely small one, where "word gets around," and where many vets know each other and their conditions of employment. TCF's abysmal reputation -- for animal care; for working conditions; for failure to properly support vet and other staff -- will make it almost impossible for any recognized clinical chimp vet with the appropriate level of training and experience (e.g., of the calibre of Dr. Frost) to go and work for TCF. We believe that this vicious cycle will only continue, as evidenced both by Dr. Manus' departure and TCF's corresponding advertisement for a postdoctoral fellow, recent graduate or graduates with 1-2 years of experience. This is all the more disturbing because TCF is by far the world's largest captive chimp colony, and owns upwards of 500 chimps -- and the corresponding financial and animal care responsibility for the next 30-40 years. And this of course does not even take into consideration ownership and corresponding lifetime care responsibility of a single Air Force chimp. This continuing failure to maintain experienced, competent clinical chimp vets will have continuing ramifications for compliance with animal welfare laws and fulfilling Congress' clear intent for providing "adequate care" for any Air Force chimps awarded to TCF -- in both the short- and long-term. In fact, we challenge you to find a single facility -- chimpanzee or otherwise -- that has anywhere near this extraordinary professional staffing turnover.

For that matter, we believe that you will also find it impossible to find any responsible scientist who will support Fred Coulston's fringe, anti-scientific views of chimpanzees and AIDS, which have generated national controversy in such national media outlets as the New York Times, Boston Globe and Wall Street Journal. Dr. Coulston has advocated the use of chimps to test toxic chemicals; has used them to test inks and industrial solvents; wrote to the Air Force in January 1993 of his "unusual view" of chimps, as "models" for "toxicology/pharmacology" (clearly indicating potential plans to use Air Force chimps in such testing, since his letter discussed obtaining ownership of the Air Force chimps); has stated that chimps can be raised "like cattle" for living blood and organ banks; and has called AIDS a "silly disease" whose patients should be forced to display "quarantine" signs outside their doors. Is this the kind of fate -- not to mention the worldwide condemnation -- the Air Force is willing to risk by awarding a single chimp to TCF, which we believe would also constitute clear, prima facie contravention of its own strict financial and animal care RFP criteria as well as Congress' intent?

C. Other Professional Staff Departures

Since May 1994, three on-site veterinary pathologists, as well as TCF's enrichment director, have also left:

• Thomas Barbolt, DVM, Ph.D. (veterinary pathologist; left in mid-1995; last known location, Ethicon);
• Gary Sibert, DVM, Ph.D. (veterinary pathologist);
• John Trupkiewicz, DVM, Ph.D. (veterinary pathologist, left in mid-1997, last known location, Philadelphia Zoo);
• Elaine Struthers, Ph.D. (enrichment director, left in August 1997).

On-site pathologists are critical for any facility's diagnostic program, as well as for the preventive veterinary care required by the Animal Welfare Act. For example, timely and accurate necropsy and pathology reports are critical to ensure the proper care of the surviving members of the colony. However, the lack of an-site pathologist can cripple this extremely important function of any competent animal care and use program (IDA does not know if TCF currently has an on-site pathologist).

Questions surrounding the adequacy of TCF's pathology and diagnostic program are perhaps best exemplified by the death of a 25-year-old chimp named Panda in July 1997. As stated above, according to a July 31, 1997 USDA inspection report, TCF was suffering an outbreak of Shigella that USDA characterized as a "public health risk" in addition to being indicative of AWA violations (which were reflected in the March 1998 USDA charges). However, according to a September 30, 1997 article in the Washington Square News (the NYU student newspaper), TCF did not know the cause of Panda's death more than two months after she died, and attempted to blame NYU for her death (carefully implying that she was sick upon arrival at TCF, but giving not a scintilla of evidence to back up this very serious allegation). This is clearly unacceptable for any competent facility, let alone the world's largest captive chimp colony.

Dr. Struthers' departure also marked a new low for TCF's enrichment program, mandated by the AWA, which had been understaffed for years. To IDA's knowledge, TCF has not yet hired a permanent replacement for Dr. Struthers, who departed almost one year ago. Sources had informed IDA that at one point, Dr. Struthers had asked for just one full-time assistant -- for a facility with over 500 chimps and 500 monkeys -- but was told by TCF management that she didn't need the help. Even TCF's own paid consultant wrote the following (page 7) in his June 30, 1995 on-site visit report:

Note that the consultant's recommendation that Dr. Struthers have at least three full-time assistants was made before TCF took on the additional responsibility of 100 chimps from LEMSIP, and before TCF took on the additional responsibility of 21 Air Force-owned chimps from Southwest Foundation (it if course did not take into account chimps born during the past three years). The departure of Dr. Struthers -- whom TCF's consultant complimented very highly in his report, as he did the also-departed Dr. Pat Frost -- is made all the more serious because of the special enrichment and socialization needs of the LEMSIP and Southwest Air Force chimps. Many of the LEMSIP chimps had been singly housed, which would necessitate that much more care and work by a qualified, professional enrichment director and staff in order to place them properly and safely in stable social groups. Chimps housed singly for years can display behavioral pathologies that require months, if not years, of careful monitoring and remediation before safe and stable social groups can be formed. In fact, one of the chimps mentioned in the March 1998 USDA charges was Jello, a former LEMSIP animal whose relatively new social group status may have contributed to his negligent death.

Moreover, the daunting task of socializing the formerly singly housed LEMSIP chimps is exacerbated by the fact that the social groups in which the Air Force chimps had been at Southwest had been destroyed, because most of the Southwest Air Force chimps had been mixed in with non-Air Force chimps. Because of the destruction of these often long-standing social groups at Southwest, TCF must take special care to integrate Southwest chimps who had just been taken from stable social group into new TCF social groups. Again, this process can be delicate, time-consuming and dangerous for even the most qualified and experienced enrichment personnel. But how can the special needs of the former LEMSIP and Southwest chimps possibly be met without an official Enrichment Director, and without support for enrichment -- support that TCF management has consistently failed to show for years, even to the point of (once again) ignoring the recommendations of its own paid consultant? And how can such an apparent lack of support possibly meet the stringent RFP criteria of meeting the chimps' "medical and other needs"?

D. Lack of Training Program/Inexperienced Vets Forced to Provide Research Support, Clinical Care

Last year, IDA filed a complaint with USDA and NIH funding agencies, based on whistleblower revelations, regarding TCF's lack of an adequate training program. Reliable sources informed IDA not only did TCF fail to have a veterinary training program, but also that extremely inexperienced chimp vets -- some fresh out of vet school -- were being forced to provide unsupervised research support and clinical care. (Again, we strongly encourage the Air Force to obtain the USDA investigative case file for the March 19, 1998 formal USDA charges, which should contain further information regarding this.) We need not tell you the ramifications of this for compliance with animal welfare laws as well as the strict RFP criteria and Congress' intent for the chimps. This would be entirely consistent with the formal USDA charge that TCF had failed to "establish and maintain programs of adequate veterinary care, including procedures and equipment for emergency care." This apparent lack of a training program, and inexperienced vets being forced to provide clinical care, is exemplified by the entirely preventable death of Echo, a healthy two-year-old female chimp, who died on March 24, 1997 after a four-hour operation for a non-life-threatening injury after being untreated for shock. Echo was financially supported by, and therefore part of, TCF's breeding contract with the FDA (TCF only briefly described the circumstances surrounding her death in its progress report to the FDA, and did not mention at all the abject negligence and multiple violations of the AWA involved in her death). As the Air Force knows, the USDA filed three extremely serious charges related to her veterinary care: That she was not treated for shock, and was not given adequate pre-procedural care; that TCF vets performed an extensive surgery under "inappropriate conditions"; and that there was inadequate post-surgical monitoring.

The TCF vets who treated Echo were so inexperienced that they were actually forced to consult a surgery manual while the young chimp was on the operating table. As stated above, all three vets were recent graduates of vet school (two had graduated in 1996, one in 1995). Two vets had, at most, seven months clinical chimp experience; the third had, at most, two months clinical chimp experience. Echo's entirely preventable death, and the resulting very serious USDA charges, are directly related to TCF management's continuing failure to maintain the adequate veterinary staffing necessary to meet the minimum requirements of "establish[ing] and maintain[ing] programs of adequate veterinary care, including procedures and equipment for emergency care" -- a failure that directly and adversely affects compliance with animal welfare laws as well as the requirements of the RFP and Congress. Moreover, the May 1994 NIH on-site visit report also recognized the need for an adequate training program, stating that "additional training and experience would be necessary for them [vets other than Dr. Frost] to function fully as independent and effective chimpanzee clinicians." Again, this statement was made before all of TCF's most-experienced chimp vets (with the exception of Dr. Cummins, who had departed just prior to the visit) had left the facility, and before TCF had taken on the added responsibility of an additional 121 chimps from LEMSIP and the Southwest Foundation. Indeed, the need for an adequate training program is that much more necessary when one has a staff of extremely inexperienced clinical chimp vets, especially for the world's largest captive chimp colony. But it is clear from the formal USDA charges, the entirely preventable deaths of young, healthy chimps, and the current official USDA IES investigation into yet more chimp deaths, that such a training program has been very much lacking.

E. Current Veterinary Staffing at TCF

To IDA's knowledge, the following comprise the current veterinary staff at TCF:

• Dr. Deb Stauffer (graduated vet school 1996; has, at most, 17 months clinical chimp experience; also, IDA has been informed, but has been unable to confirm, that Dr. Stauffer is not a full-time clinical vet for TCF);
• Dr. Scott Walden (graduated vet school 1995; has, at most, 23 months clinical chimp experience);

  NOTE: Drs. Stauffer and Walden, along with the departed Dr. Keith Jenne, were the vets who operated on Echo. IDA has much more detailed information on Echo's veterinary care, which we would be happy to provide upon request.

• Dr. Chris Staley (unknown clinical chimp experience, but does have such experience; hired by TCF as Director of Veterinary Sciences in June 1997).

NOTE: Numerous sources, both inside and outside of TCF, have informed IDA that Dr. Staley, despite his alleged status as "Director of Veterinary Sciences," in fact works at TCF only part-time. This would be consistent with Dr. Staley's retaining his private veterinary practice in Alamogordo, NM. It should also be noted that the veterinarian Dr. Staley had hired to help with his practice has apparently recent quit that practice.

• Dr. Larson (hired within past 6-8 months; formerly worked in Boston area, possibly Boston University; obtained veterinary degree in Denmark; unknown clinical chimp experience).

To IDA's knowledge, this is the clinical chimp staff for the world's largest captive chimp colony. To IDA's knowledge, none of these staff members -- at the world's largest chimp colony -- are recognized as experts in the clinical chimp vet community, and it appears that at least two of these four known vets are extremely inexperienced in clinical chimpanzee care. How can such a staff possibly provide the "adequate care" for the Air Force chimps mandated by Congress, especially considering that TCF already owns 500 chimps and 450 monkeys?

F. Current Enrichment Staffing at TCF

To IDA's knowledge, the following personnel comprise TCF's enrichment program:

• Tom Rice, interim director (no Ph.D. or other advanced degree);
• David Seelig (undergraduate student in the middle of a one-year internship, mainly works with TCF's monkeys, no advanced degree, sources have informed IDA that Seelig recently left the facility, and did not know whether or not he would return).

How could this staffing even approach being considered adequate for the world's largest chimp colony -- a colony with special needs of the former LEMSIP and Southwest Air Force chimps, as described above? It is important to note that the RFP does place an emphasis on preserving existing social groups, thus recognizing the critical importance of an adequate, qualified enrichment staff and program to meet the chimps' "medical and other needs." Would this staffing be even close to the recommendation of TCF's own paid consultant, who stated in June 1995 -- before the added responsibility of the 121 additional chimps from LEMSIP and Southwest, as well as however many chimps have been born in the last three years -- that the now-departed Dr. Struthers should have at least three full-time, dedicated enrichment staff, in addition to herself?

G. Another Key Staff Departure

Within the past 2-3 months, Robert Cunningham, Esq. left TCF, and his departure is highly significant. Cunningham was TCF's vice-president, in-house legal counsel and chairman of its IACUC. But, more importantly, Cunningham was in the upper echelons of TCF management (we have been told, but been unable to confirm, that Cunningham was in charge of day-to-day operations, and that Fred Coulston has taken over that responsibility). Perhaps the most important aspect of Cunningham's leaving is that he was, according to sources, at one time considered the heir apparent to Fred Coulston, who is 83 years old. Who is now the heir apparent to the 83-year-old Dr. Coulston? Would not questions surrounding Dr. Coulston's succession have direct relevance to an Air Force decision that will have ramifications for the next 30-40 years? IDA sources with knowledge of TCF's inner workings were all very surprised by Cunningham's departure, and thought it highly significant. For a supposed heir apparent in the upper echelons of TCF management to leave after four years -- one source said that Cunningham had said that he considered TCF his "dream job" -- is very significant. It is also another indication that TCF's staffing turmoil continues.

4. TCF'S REPEATED FAILURES TO FULFILL LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

A. The Eileen T. and Frederick Coulston Toxicology Chair at NMSU

On April 16, 1993, Fred Coulston signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with New Mexico State University (NSMU). This legally binding agreement -- in response to an RFP issued by NMSU -- stated the conditions under which Coulston would obtain ownership of NMSU's Primate Research Lab (PRL), which included approximately 200 chimps. The parallels to the current Air Force RFP, and any promises that TCF may make to the Air Force in an attempt to obtain ownership of another set of chimps, are obvious.

One of the conditions in the NMSU MOA was for Dr. Coulston to fund an Eileen T. and Frederick Coulston Toxicology Chair at NMSU, which NMSU clearly told Dr. Coulston would cost at least $500,000. This pledge to fund an NMSU toxicology chair was an integral part of the MOA for Coulston to obtain ownership of the NMSU chimps, as evidenced by the Minutes of the NMSU Regents (page 7, April 16, 1993), in which then-president James Halligan states:

Note the integral part that this Chair was supposed to have played in the legally binding contract to transfer PRL to TCF. Well, it is now over five years later --

Where is the Eileen T. and Frederick Coulston Toxicology Chair at NMSU?

For that matter, where are the opportunity scholarships Coulston also was contractually obligated to fund, or the collaborative research with NMSU scientists that he promised?

Did Coulston comply with this legally binding contractual obligation? The status of the promised Eileen T. and Frederick Coulston Toxicology Chair at NMSU clearly indicates that the answer is "no."

Moreover, how can the Air Force possibly believe any of TCF's promises when it has clearly failed to meet legally binding contractual obligations directly related to Coulston's response to an RFP regarding the transfer of permanent ownership of chimps? Is that not the same exact situation that exists today with the Air Force RFP, and the transfer of Air Force chimps? However, perhaps there is one salient difference that the Air Force should keep in mind: Congress mandated that competitive procedures be used by the Air Force, and that the recipient of the chimps provide adequate care. There also exists the very strict financial, animal care and other criteria of the Air Force's own RFP. We believe that Congress would look very closely at any award to a facility that we believe not only clearly cannot meet the RFP's strict financial and animal care criteria, but also has a documented history of failing to fulfill legally binding contractual obligations, including those directly related to Coulston's response to an RFP for transfer of ownership of another set of chimpanzees. In addition, TCF's dire long-term financial outlook, as described above, is made that much worse because it still technically owes NMSU at least $500,000 (perhaps more, with five years worth of interest) for its contractually obligated "Eileen T. and Frederick Coulston Toxicology Chair."

In fact, we believe that the Air Force would be negligent if it did not contact entities that have done business in the past with TCF -- such as NMSU and the Buckshire Corporation (the latter is suing TCF for breaking the conditions of its lease of chimpanzees to the facility. The allegations include TCF's allegedly improper and unauthorized use of the Buckshire chimps in corrosive protocols). These former business partners could give the Air Force a clearer idea of TCF's ability to fulfill legally binding promises -- promises like those no doubt contained in TCF's bid to the Air Force.

B. TCF's Sexual Harassment Lawsuit Loss and the Equal Employment Opportunity Clause

On April 22, 1998, a jury in federal district court in Las Cruces, NM found that TCF violated Title 7, which prohibits sexual harassment, and "subjected [plaintiff] to a hostile environment of sexual harassment."

This verdict -- a finding of fact in a federal court of law -- could indicate that TCF has violated the Equal Employment Opportunity clause in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) (Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations), which govern contractors and subcontractors that receive federal money. TCF receives millions of dollars each year from contracts with NIH and FDA. FAR also incorporates Executive Order 11246, issued by President Lyndon Johnson in 1965, which states that contractors who receive federal money "will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."

EO 11246 also states that a federal contractor's funding can be suspended or terminated, or other sanctions imposed by the U.S. Department of Labor, if found in violation of the provisions of EO 11246. As stated above, the office of Representative Carolyn Maloney is aware of this verdict.

Did TCF comply with EO 11246 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Clause -- both legally binding contractual obligations? The verdict against TCF -- a finding of fact by a jury in a federal court of law -- clearly indicates that the answer is "no."

C. The Formal USDA Charges

As part of its contracts and subcontracts with NIH and FDA, TCF has pledged to comply with federal animal welfare laws. Such promises of compliance are also part of the Air Force RFP, and are clearly inherent in Congress' intent that the chimps receive "adequate care." IDA believes that the formal USDA charges clearly indicate that TCF has broken that legally binding contractual obligation. We believe this is exemplified by the TCF contract with NIAID (contract number N01-AI-75318, "House, Care and Implement AIDS Research Protocols on Chimpanzees," later changed to "HIV-1 Vaccine Research in the Chimpanzee Model"), which specifically states that the contractor (TCF) shall:

TCF president Travis Griffin signed this contact -- which included this pledge to comply with federal animal welfare laws -- the very day (March 24, 1997) that Echo died -- a death found by USDA to have involved multiple violations of the AWA. In addition, subsequent USDA inspections found numerous violations (e.g., physical plant, cage and sanitary violations) that also were reflected in the March 19, 1998 USDA charges.

Did TCF comply with this legally binding contractual obligation that also has direct relevance to the Air Force RFP and Congress' intent for the Air Force chimps' care? The USDA charges clearly indicate that the answer is "no."

D. The USDA Cease and Desist Order

On June 21, 1996, TCF settled the first set of formal USDA charges (for the overheating deaths of three chimps, the water deprivation deaths of four monkeys, and numerous chimp cage size violations) by agreeing to pay a $40,000 fine and, most importantly, promising to cease and desist from violating the Animal Welfare Act. However, only months later, both Jello and Echo died, and USDA found evidence of negligence and violations of the AWA in both deaths, as well as TCF's entire animal care and use program (failure to "establish and maintain programs of adequate veterinary care, including procedures and equipment for emergency care") and numerous physical plant and sanitary violations.

Did TCF comply with this legally binding contractual obligation? The March 19, 1998 USDA charges clearly indicate that the answer is "no."

Again, how the Air Force possibly believe promises no doubt made by TCF in its bid -- which could include promises to comply with the strict animal care RFP criteria as well as Congress' intent -- in light of this documented history of TCF's repeatedly failing to fulfill legally binding contractual obligations, including those directly related to TCF's response to an RFP to obtain ownership of another set of chimps, as well as those directly related to compliance with federal animal welfare laws mandated by the Air Force RFP and Congressional intent?

5. THE AIR FORCE'S HISTORIC, DOCUMENTED BIAS IN FAVOR OF TCF

IDA believes it is imperative that the Air Force take into account its clear bias in favor of TCF, going back years, before it makes any decision regarding any award of chimps. We believe it is clear that serious questions have been raised regarding TCF's ability to meet the strict financial and animal care criteria of the Air Force's own RFP and Congressional intent, as well as questions regarding TCF's history of failing to fulfill legally binding contractual obligations. Therefore, in light of this evidence, we believe that an Air Force award of a single chimp to TCF will not only be questioned on the merits of this evidence, but also in light of the Air Force's documented bias in favor of TCF. In other words, we believe that a very strong case could be made that any award to TCF, given the strict RFP and Congressional criteria and TCF's failures to fulfill contractual obligations, would be seen as simply a continuation of the Air Force's clear, documented and unfair bias in favor of TCF, and in direct contravention of Congress' intent for a fair and open process as well as the Air Force's repeated claims that it is conducting such a process.

We will include only some of this documented bias in this letter, but will shortly submit more evidence, again as part of the official record of this divestiture.

A. Letters from Chimpanzee Experts Showing RFP is Flawed and Biased

As part of the official record, we have attached letters from chimpanzee experts Drs. Stephen Easley, Linda Brent, Preston Marx and Bill Cummins detailing why the Air Force chimp RFP is fatally flawed and extremely and unfairly biased in favor of TCF -- e.g., the Air has allowed TCF to withhold vital information concerning the chimps' clinical health, social group status, information about the buildings, etc. In fact, Dr. Brent of Chimp Haven -- which has submitted a bid -- wrote in November 1997 that the Air Force RFP appeared to favor TCF, that the Air Force had neglected a fair and open process, that there was not enough information on the chimps, and that the site visit notice was too short. We believe that nothing in the "final" RFP has changed the opinion of these experts -- two of whom (Dr. Marx and Dr. Cummins) actually ran the Holloman colony, which included the majority of the Air Force chimps. We believe that the official record should record our suggestion that special attention should be paid to the critical letters from these chimp experts, because they have first-hand knowledge of what is required to design, build and operate a large chimp facility, and why the information that TCF and the Air Force is denying to all non-TCF bidders is critical to meet both Congress's intent as well as the primary evaluation criteria of the Air Force's own RFP. Clearly, such denial of vital information is a clear conflict of interest, and clearly tilts the supposedly "fair and open" bidding process in TCF's favor.

As we have previously and repeatedly written to the Air Force, the fact that TCF, a bidder, is the only entity with such access to information that is absolutely required to meet the RFP's strict financial, chimp care and facility requirements is the very definition of a slanted, biased and unfair process, and is in direct contravention of Congress' intent and the Air Force's repeated claims that it is conducting a "fair and open process." Moreover, these letters demonstrate that the Air Force did not tell Congressional staffers the truth during a June 1998 briefing. In that briefing, the Air Force claimed to the staffers that animal protection groups were the only ones who had complained about the unfair, biased nature of the divestiture process. The attached letters from Drs. Easley, Marx, Cummins and Brent -- chimp experts whom we believe have far more experience and knowledge about chimps than anyone in the Air Force -- clearly demonstrate that the Air Force statement to Congress was simply untrue.

This clear bias in favor of TCF and lack of vital information that was absolutely necessary to formulate responsible financial, animal care and facility plans crippled IDA's attempts at formulating a bid that could meet the strict financial, facility and animal care criteria contained in the RFP, as well as Congress' intent for adequate care for the Air Force chimps.

B. Bias in Favor of TCF Dating Back to 1995

In April/May 1995, the Air Force attempted to simply give away to TCF the chimps and the Holloman buildings -- including the buildings the Air Force now claims it does not even own -- by attaching a legislative provision to a military construction bill. This giveaway was blocked because (1) of questions raised about TCF's animal care record (USDA filed its first set of formal charges only months after the bill was introduced), and (2) the lack of an open bid process. Those concerns are even more valid today, because (1) TCF's animal care record has become much worse (as reflected in the second set of USDA charges as well as current official USDA investigation into yet more chimp deaths), and (2) in no way, shape or form is there is a "fair and open" bid process because of the Air Force's repeatedly demonstrated bias in favor of TCF.

In fact, we believe there are extremely disturbing parallels between the Air Force's attempts to make TCF appear a compliant and upstanding facility in 1994/1995 and 1997/1998, including what we believe are repeated Air Force lies of omission to Congress. We believe it is extremely important to remember when reading these Air Force statements that, if one uses repeat formal USDA charges as a benchmark, TCF has the worst documented animal care record of any registered research facility in the 32-year history of the Animal Welfare Act.

Here is what Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services, stated about the proposal to give away the chimps and the buildings to TCF (Thursday, April 27, 1995, Legislative day of Monday, April 24, 1995, 141 Cong Rec S 5832):

We believe that this language and information was almost certainly supplied by the Air Force -- after all, as Rep. Joel Hefley (the sponsor of the bill in the House) wrote to a constituent, Carol Buchanan, on June 23, 1995, "The U.S. Air Force requested that Congress allow them to convey the chimpanzees at Holloman AFB and the $10 million chimp facility to the Coulston Foundation....The Air Force request was to give the facility and the chimps to [TCF]." Again, note the Air Force attempted to convey the $10 million chimp facility it now claims it does not even own. Clearly, Thurmond's comments in the Congressional Record -- almost certainly supplied by, or at least countenanced by, the Air Force -- paint a very rosy picture of TCF -- TCF has "demonstrated expertise with primate research programs," and since July 1993, TCF has "demonstrated its...expertise in program management." Yet this statement was made less than three months before the USDA filed its first set of formal charges against TCF. In addition, the Air Force knew full well that TCF was under official USDA investigation for the overheating deaths of three chimps, the water deprivation deaths of four monkeys, and numerous chimp cage violations. Indeed, a cursory glance at TCF's USDA inspection reports would have revealed repeated violations. Moreover, we had written to the Air Force of numerous concerns regarding TCF's animal care record after the Air Force signed its lease with TCF in September 1994. Yet the Air Force apparently had the temerity not only to provide Senator Thurmond with this disinformation -- or at least countenance its provision -- BUT APPARENTLY TO USE IT AS A REASON FOR GIVING AWAY THE AIR FORCE CHIMPS AND BUILDINGS (INCLUDING THE $10 MILLION COMPLEX IT NOW CLAIMS IT DOES NOT EVEN OWN) TO TCF!

Here is a similar statement regarding TCF's excellent record, in a letter from Lt. Col. Beth Unklesbay of the Air Force's Legislative Liaison Division to then-Senator Howell Heflin, dated June 12, 1995 -- less than one month before USDA filed formal charges: "[W]e have thoroughly reviewed the qualifications of the Coulston Foundation to provide competent care for the animals. The Coulston Foundation, under the leadership of Dr. Frederick Coulston, has been successfully involved with the care of the animals during various segments of the past two decades [in reality, TCF was incorporated in 1993]....The most recent USDA inspection of the animal treatment was favorable....We strongly believe the Air Force has acted responsibly and has selected an option [apparently the proposed giveaway to TCF, it is unclear from the letter] that continues to provide for the care and welfare of the chimpanzees." Just as in the Congressional Record information provided to Sen. Thurmond, note the careful omission of the inconvenient fact that TCF was under official USDA investigation for multiple violations of the AWA, or that there was a readily available paper trail demonstrating serious animal welfare violations (including not only USDA inspection reports, but also the extremely damning May 1994 NIH on-site visit report that found deficient veterinary and caretaking staffing; Fred Coulston as a voting member of his own IACUC; and an animal care and use program that did not meet the minimal provisions of the NIH Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals).

Another letter, dated November 3, 1994, from Lt. Col. Thomas W. Shubert of the Air Force's Office of Legislative Liaison, to Rep. Jay Inslee: "When NMSU gave notice [that it was not interested in renewing its lease to care for the Air Force chimps], the Air Force had sufficient confidence in the professional competence of the Coulston Foundation, based upon the last year's operation, to grant a follow-on lease....It may also be pertinent to point out that the head of the Coulston Foundation, Doctor Frederick Coulston, has had a long career in primate research...."

July 6, 1995 (the very day USDA filed its first set of charges), letter from Unklesbay to Senator Rick Santorum: "Dr. Coulston has successfully been involved with the care of these animals during various segments of the past two decades....The most recent USDA inspection was favorable and only minor problems noted."

February 23, 1995, Unklesbay to Senator John Warner: Same as November 3, 1994 letter to Rep. Jay Inslee. Again, no mention to a member of Congress of an ongoing official USDA investigation.

Now, fast-forward to 1997/1998. TCF's animal care problems have become much worse, as the toll taken by experienced vets' departures mounts. Once again, by omission and commission, the Air Force repeatedly attempts to make it appear that everything is fine at TCF (perhaps laying the groundwork for a Congressional acceptance of TCF's obtaining the chimps during the allegedly "fair and open" process), while once again carefully omitting the inconvenient fact that TCF was, once again, under official USDA investigation for multiple negligent chimp deaths. However, this time a lie of omission is compounded by a lie of commission -- that the most recent inspection reports reported only minor deficiencies. The USDA inspection reports from Summer 1997 found extremely serious violations -- including the Shigella outbreak that killed at least one chimp (Panda) and was characterized by USDA as a "public health risk," as well as numerous physical plant, caging and sanitary violations that were listed as part of the March 1998 formal charges against TCF. It should be noted also the very serious nature of a single official USDA investigation, let alone more than one -- but again, there is no mention of that to a member of Congress. But such inconvenient facts did not sway the Air Force from its apparent goal, by omission and commission, to make it appear to Congress and the public that TCF was adequately caring for the chimps, and was in compliance with animal welfare laws:

August 13, 1997 from Joseph Connell of Air Force LLO to Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison; October 8, 1997 letter from Lt. Col. Marcia Rossi, LLO to Ms. Graciela Iparraguirre; September 1997 letter sent to Rep. Stephen Horn by Connell: "The most recent USDA inspection [of the HAFB facilities] was favorable, with only minor problems noted." Note the disingenuous way that the Air Force conveniently neglects to mention -- again, to a member of Congress -- the serious violations found at TCF's La Velle Rd. facilities, which are under the same TCF management as the HAFB facilities. It is also important to note that Echo, whose March 24, 1997 death USDA found constituted multiple violations the Animal Welfare Act, died at Holloman. There is no mention in this August 13, 1997 letter to Sen. Hutchison of the official USDA investigations against TCF, including the one involving Echo's death; TCF's extraordinary vet staffing turnover (at the date of this letter, ten vets had left since May 1994, with 4 of the 10 leaving since February 1997); the negligent deaths of Jello and Echo; the numerous physical plant, sanitary and cage violations found by USDA; nor the fundamental deficiencies in TCF's entire animal care program that prompted USDA to file the single most serious charge ever filed against a registered research facility (March 19, 1998): that TCF failed to "establish and maintain programs of adequate veterinary care, including procedures and equipment for emergency care."

August 15, 1997, letter from Rep. Sherrod Brown to constituent Sylvia Ann Wenman: "According to the Air Force, the most recent USDA inspection of the Holloman AFB facilities was favorable" (emphasis added). November 3, 1997 fact sheet sent to Rep. Newt Gingrich: "The most recent USDA inspection [of the HAFB facilities] was favorable." What happened to the "minor problems," let alone any mention of ongoing official USDA investigations?

May 6, 1998 -- almost two months after USDA filed its unprecedented second set of formal charges on March 19, 1998 -- and the Air Force is still painting TCF in the best possible light (at least they're consistent; why mention formal USDA charges when you don't mention official USDA investigations?) (letter from Marcia Rossi to Ms. Connie Riddell): "The most recent USDA inspection [of the HAFB facilities] was favorable, with only minor deficiencies noted."

August 4, 1997, letter from Lt. Col. Patricia Fornes, LLO, to Rep. Peter King: "The most recent USDA inspection [of the HAFB facilities] was favorable, with only minor deficiencies noted....The Air Force is currently in the process of conducting a fair and open competitive process...." More on this supposedly "fair and open" process below.

The Air Force's bias has manifested itself in many other ways. For example, as mentioned above, the Air Force is allowing TCF to withhold from all other bidders vital information about the Air Force's own chimps and own buildings -- information that is absolutely necessary to fulfill the Air Force's own primary evaluation criteria of providing for the chimps' "medical and other needs." Without such information, no potential bidder can formulate the responsible financial, facility and animal care plans mandated by the Air Force's own RFP. The only bidder with access to this vital information is TCF. This state of affairs constitutes not only a clear conflict of interest, but is also the very definition of an unfair, anti-competitive process. We believe it is also a clear violation of Congress' intent to have the Air Force divest of the chimps in a fair and open process. Indeed, the Air Force has repeatedly claimed that it is conducting a "fair and open" process, and that its major priority is the welfare of the chimps. However, we believe its actions regarding the divestiture, and its clear bias in favor of TCF, indicate otherwise. Indeed, the December 30, 1997 Wall Street Journal article quotes the officer in charge of the divestment, Col. Blackhurst, as calling the chimps surplus "equipment."

In addition, as stated above, chimp experts with decades of experience clinically treating chimps as well as operating large chimp colonies -- including two former directors of the Holloman facilities, which include the Air Force chimps -- have stated that the Air Force RFP is fatally flawed; some say it is biased in favor of TCF; and others state it does not contain the information necessary to formulate responsible financial and facility plans to properly care for the Air Force chimps.

Another example of the Air Force's pro-Coulston bias was the ludicrous conditions of the "site visit" to HAFB. This site visit was supposed to provide potential bidders with vital information about the complex and buildings needed to help formulate a responsible chimp care plan. The Air Force stated that the conditions came after "negotiation" with TCF (for a much better, more expert appraisal of the site visit and the RFP, please see letter from Dr. Easley, former Enrichment Director at Holloman, who attended the site visit). The site visitors were not allowed into a single chimp housing building; were not allowed to look into any windows of the nursery; were only allowed into an administration building; were only allowed to see some chimps at a distance (neither Dr. Marx nor Dr. Easley, who had first-hand experience with the Air Force chimps, could tell whether or not they were seeing Air Force or TCF chimps); and were given less than two weeks notice of the visit (please see Dr. Linda Brent's letter to Air Force complaining about the short notice, which prevented her from attending; also note her statement that the Air Force had neglected a fair and open process, and that it appeared to favor TCF).

Another example of this bias is the Air Force's irresponsible decision to send to TCF 21 Air Force chimps, who had been housed at the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research in Texas for years (beginning in the 1970s), only months before the bid process is scheduled to be decided. The Air Force shipped these chimps to TCF (one shipment of ten in mid-February, another of 11 in mid-March) with full knowledge that (1) yet another veterinarian had submitted her resignation, making her (at the time before Dr. Manus' July 1998 departure) the fifth vet to leave since February 1997, and the 11th to leave TCF since May 1994, and (2) that TCF was again under official USDA investigation. In fact, the USDA filed its latest formal charges less than one week after the second shipment of chimps from Southwest -- a facility that, unlike TCF, has a good animal care record and experienced chimp vets and psychological enrichment personnel.

The Southwest transfer raises serious questions about the Air Force's handling of this entire situation; calls into question the Air Force's repeated claims that its major goal is to ensure the chimps' welfare (if so, why send 21 chimps to a facility that USDA has found, once again, to have multiply violated the Animal Welfare Act and to have serious problems caring for the animals it already had, and was in the midst of yet more staffing turmoil); and also calls into question whether or not the Air Force has already made its decision regarding the bid (after all, why not wait a few months until the bid is actually decided, before shipping chimps from a facility with a good animal care record to a facility that has a dangerously inexperienced chimp vet staff, and which just had an unprecedented second set of formal USDA charges filed against it, and which is currently under official USDA investigation for yet more chimp deaths). A Congressional staffer informed IDA that the Air Force has stated that this transfer was in the works for years; but if the Air Force had waited years, why not wait a few more months?

Finally, the Air Force's own RFP states that it will give preference to bidders who preserve existing chimp social groups; yet the Air Force's decision to send the chimps from Southwest destroyed virtually every social group the Southwest chimps were in, since they were mixed in with non-Air Force chimps. This is even more problematic because, to IDA's knowledge, TCF has not yet hired a permanent replacement for Dr. Elaine Struthers, its former Enrichment Director who resigned almost a year ago, in August 1997.

However, as we have clearly demonstrated, such bias is nothing new, and dates back to the Air Force's 1995 attempts to simply give away to TCF the chimps as well as buildings it allegedly now doesn't even own.

PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT IDA WILL SHORTLY BE SUBMITTING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE DIVESTITURE.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Eric Kleiman

Research Director
In Defense of Animals
717-939-3231

cc: Captain Renee Richardson
Phil Sheuerman, Esq.
Colonel John Golden
Colonel Denver Marlow
Sen. Strom Thurmond
Rep. Carolyn Maloney
Dr. Helmut Hellwig

Resources

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• Main AF Chimpanzee Campaign Page
• Transcript of NBC's Dateline Segment on the Coulston Foundation
• Plight of the Air Force Chimpanzees Fact Sheet
• IDA Statement in Response to Air Force Chimp Giveaway
• Associated Press Article on Air Force Chimpanzee Divestiture
• 21 Air Force Chimpanzees Freed.

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